fugitive peace

Picture: Hadar Naim

Yesterday the unthinkable happened. I stood in front of a large audience at a conference in Tel Aviv and said that I thought Binyamin “Bibi” Netanyahu was Israel’s best choice for prime minister. (Actually I said “most interesting”, not “best”, but if we’re being honest, what’s the difference.)

If my Palestinian friends find out they will stop talking to me. Maybe most of my Israeli friends too. Politically I’m somewhere to the left of Meretz. Was I out of my mind?

It was the Globes annual business conference, and I was speaking about Israel’s long-term economic prospects. The main problem, I said, was political stability. Governments change so often that it inhibits serious policymaking.

I took the world financial crisis as an example. Israel should not be feeling the pain much. Its markets were hardly exposed to the strange financial instruments that have brought the rest of the developed world to its knees. Its exports will suffer, but that should only produce a mild slowdown. But the banks are panicking and shutting down credit, ignoring the Bank of Israel’s sharp interest-rate cuts, and that is causing the whole economy to shudder. Growth will be around 1.5% next year by the Bank of Israel’s estimate; in per-capita terms, that’s a recession.

What’s needed is a fiscal stimulus plan. But with Israel yet again in an election cycle, it’s impossible to get a serious one passed. There is a package, but frankly, it’s a joke.

When Netanyahu was finance minister he did a lot of good things. He introduced sensible fiscal management, which provided greater economic stability - the month-long war in 2006 hardly caused a blip in the economy - and reformed the financial markets; one effect of those reforms was to separate banking, insurance and asset management, specifically to prevent a crisis in one part of the financial system infecting the rest of it.

He also did a lot of harm to the poor and the middle class because, as is often the case with economic reforms, it was the rich that benefited first. The welfare-to-work “Wisconsin programme” got lots of people into work, but it didn’t make them better off, just increased the numbers of the working poor. The number of mortgages has been falling steadily too, which is a bad sign for the middle class’s health. But I’ve talked to some of Bibi’s policy whizkids over the years I’ve been here, and I think they recognise the mistakes.

So if we’re talking about economic policy, he has a more ambitious and intelligent one than his rivals. And a Likud government will be more stable than either a Kadima or Labour one, and more able to make reforms happen. For Israel, this is better.

For the Palestinians, of course, Likud is a different story.

Bibi says he doesn’t want to reach even a vague final-status agreement with Abbas now, as Olmert has been trying to for the past year. He talks instead about something called “economic peace”. This translates as: we’ll try to boost the West Bank economy enough so that they stop wanting to bomb us, and then, once they’re nice and quiet, we’ll think about talking about negotiating about working towards possible moves that might, in the fullness of time, when the moment is ripe, and without prejudice to Israel’s right to bomb the hell out of anyone it thinks is a threat, lead, eventually and in the long run, to Palestinian independence. Oh, and let’s not even mention Gaza.

You can guess what I think of that.

However, the fact is that neither Kadima nor Labour is offering the Palestinians anything better. Olmert’s offer of a “shelf agreement”, along with half-baked measures to boost the West Bank’s economy while strangling Gaza in an attempt to get the Palestinians living there to turn on Hamas, amounts to pretty much the same thing, just dressed up more nicely.

In fact, it’s better for the Palestinians to have an Israeli prime minister who doesn’t even pretend he wants to give them a state than one who claims to be working on it very hard while indefinitely stringing the process along because s/he has nothing else to offer as a policy platform. It may not be better for Abbas himself; his political survival depends on stringing out the process just as much as Olmert’s did and Livni’s will. But if that’s the best he can offer his people, he should go too.

Furthermore: if Olmert were, by some already thankfully remote chance, to reach a shelf agreement with Abbas before the election in February, it would be a disaster for the Palestinians, and for Abbas personally. Armed with that agreement, Bibi would be in an even stronger position to say that there is nothing more to talk about.

(I don’t, by the way, set much store by the argument, typical of certain hopeful leftists, that Israel’s biggest peace concessions have been made by Likud leaders. Netanyahu handed over most of Hebron to Palestinian control signed the Wye River Memorandum when he was prime minister in 1988, but under duress, not because, like Ariel Sharon with Gaza or Menachem Begin with the Sinai, he suddenly woke up and decided that it was the right thing to do.)

The other main thing to give one pause is that Bibi, to whom we owe the immortal fear-mongering line “It is 1938, and Iran is Nazi Germany”, is the man most likely to send Israeli fighters to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities and possibly start another war to bring the entire Middle East down in even more flames than are engulfing it already. But I think if Israel had any window for bombing Iran, it ends when Barack Obama is sworn in. Without at least tacit support from the United States, he can’t do it.

So I say Bibi for prime minister. And by as many seats as possible. The Israeli left needs a total defeat if it’s to rise as a serious political force again.

I just outlined this reasoning to one of my Meretz-voting Israeli friends. He said, “Wow. You’re thinking like an Israeli.”

(And, just to make it clear, this is not the official position of The Economist.)

Photo: Antônio Milena/ABr

Just when I leave, it gets exciting.

I finished my posting for The Economist in Jerusalem nearly three weeks ago (am now taking six months off, most of it in Israel). I went to the UK for two weeks and missed the Hizbullah prisoner swap and the Obama visit.

And now Olmert’s quitting.

After his announcement that he won’t stand in the Kadima primary in September, lots of opposition politicians are predictably predicting the party’s imminent demise. Neither Tsipi Livni nor Shaul Mofaz will be able to hold it together, they say. There’ll have to be elections anyway.

True, it’ll be hard. But the survival instinct is a wonderful thing. Kadima has something to work towards: the “framework interim outline shelf agreement” or whatever the hell it is they’ve been negotiating with Mahmoud Abbas. (Sorry, I can’t help being cynical, even though I hear in occasional conversations with people “close to the negotiations” that they’re actually going pretty well.) As long as they have that, they justify their existence — if not directly to the Israeli public, then at least to the Bush administration, whose backing can help prop up the government.

And the administration doesn’t want anything to stop this agreement being signed. A source of mine confirms that the report by Jim Jones, the American security coordinator, which says very harsh things about Israeli policy in the occupied territories, is going to be suppressed despite strenuous efforts by Jones himself to get it published. Presumably they’re afraid the Israelis are even less likely to make concessions to Abbas if it looks like they’re doing it under pressure.

What the agreement will actually say if Tsipi Livni takes over from Olmert is harder to guess; while he and Abbas get on just fine, she’s apparently a much tougher cookie in her branch of the negotiations. Even more doubtful is whether the Syria track will continue. But as long as peace talks themselves continue she can look like she is doing something, at least until a new US president takes office and gets his bearings, which could be a while.

Moreover, without corruption scandals exploding every other day, this coalition could be relatively stable. Neither Kadima nor Labour wants an election because they will lose seats in one. And Shas, which could bring the government down if it quits, probably figures it has more leverage and can get more subsidies out of the current arrangement than if it joins a new coalition led by a powerful Likud — especially with Netanyahu, the arch-enemy of subsidies, at the helm.

It’s ironic and sad that the only way to make an Israeli prime minister (and, while we’re at it, a Palestinian president) take peace talks seriously is to make his or her political survival hang by a thread. Which is why I’m kinda glad I don’t have to write about this stuff any more. And yet I can’t help doing it anyway…

“Don’t expect the talk of peace with Syria to come true,” I said on this blog a couple of months ago. Well, now Israel and Syria are holding talks via Turkish mediation. But as my piece in this week’s issue of The Economist says, there are plenty of people who think Olmert is just doing it to divert attention from the Palestinian talks and his corruption investigation. And it may be no coincidence that Bashar al-Assad and Recep Tayyip Erdogan would welcome something to distract people from their own scandals.

Or it may indeed be just coincidence. The received wisdom now does seem to be that Syria and Israel have been trying to get talks going for a long while. And if they really wanted to, points out a friend of mine who follows Syria, it should be a piece of cake compared to negotiating Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The prices are well-known: Syria wants all of the Golan back to the June 4, 1967 border. Israel wants Syria to cut ties with Hizbullah, Hamas and Iran, though that will be harder to verify. Other issues like water rights are tricky but basically soluble.

The main problem I see is that even if Olmert and Assad are both totally serious, it doesn’t depend only on them. Syria wants the West to welcome it back into the community of nations. That gift is in the hands of the Americans, first and foremost, and they don’t believe Syria will play by the West’s rules. Perhaps more to the point, Condoleezza Rice has invested all her efforts in Israeli-Palestinian peace, which she claims is “the most mature track” (mature to the point of decomposition, if you ask me) and she doesn’t want to see her hard work and her legacy as secretary of state go down the drain. So even if Olmert is ready to give up all of the Golan, he can’t in fact give Syria what it wants.

Update (May 23): An Israeli lawyer is demanding that the attorney-general open a criminal investigation into Olmert for launching the peace talks without government approval. The news report I linked to isn’t quite accurate: it says no citizen may discuss the transfer of sovereign territory to another state. The lawyer’s letter, provided by the Israel Resource Review which published the report, cites a section from the 1977 penal code that forbids any citizen from, in his words, “an act leading to the removal of any area of land from the sovereignty of the state or its coming under the sovereignty of a foreign state,” unless the government approves it. According to him, launching peace talks without a cabinet decision, which seems to be what Olmert has done, comes under this rubric.

Of course, Olmert will only have committed an offence if his decision leads to land under Israeli sovereignty being transferred to Syria. If the peace talks go nowhere he’s not guilty. And I’m no lawyer, but I’m not sure that land occupied in wartime and not internationally recognised as part of your territory counts as land under your sovereignty. The things people waste their time on here…

A small but important lesson about opinion polls.

Three weeks ago Ha’aretz’s pollster, Camil Fuchs, published a poll showing that 64% of Israelis favour holding talks with Hamas in order to get a ceasefire and release Gilad Shalit, the captured soldier. Today the Tami Steinmetz Centre has issued the latest monthly Peace Index. It says that only 25% of Israelis and just 17% of Israeli Jews favour negotiating with Hamas.

Puzzled? So was I. I reported on the Ha’aretz poll a couple of weeks ago as evidence that Israeli opinion is shifting towards talks with Hamas. So I called Ephraim Yaar of the Steinmetz Centre for an explanation, and it turns out to be simple.

The Ha’aretz poll asked people if they supported talks with Hamas: yes or no. The Steinmetz poll asked them the best way for Israel to deal with the Qassam rockets from Gaza: (1) talks with Hamas; (2) a relatively restrained military response (though Israel’s idea of “restrained”, I should point out, still means several Palestinians killed every week); (3) a bigger but still limited response (ie, like the ground incursion that killed 110 people or so earlier this month); (4) a massive ground operation to reoccupy Gaza; (5) another option of your choice; (6) don’t know.

When you put the question like this, more Israeli Jews support reoccupying Gaza than talking to Hamas (see the table below).

So which poll is “right”? What does the Israeli public actually think about talks with Hamas?

I asked Fuchs. “When you include other options, you’re cognitively giving legitimacy to them,” he says. “What you’re doing is hinting to the person that there are other people who prefer these options.” When there’s only one option on the table, on the other hand, you’re asking them to choose between doing that and doing nothing.

In short, what the two polls taken together say is that if the people could run the government, and had a range of options for dealing with Gaza, more of them would go with a military option. However, if the government says it’s going to talk to Hamas, 64% of the public would support it (though Fuchs thinks the number now would be a little lower than three weeks ago).

Question 1: Should Israel conduct talks with Hamas towards a ceasefire and the release of Gilad Shalit?

Source: Ha’aretz/Dialog

Question 2: What is the best way for Israel to prevent rocket fire on the south?

Source: Tami Steinmetz Centre

It’s official. They’ve failed. A poll today from Khalil Shikaki’s polling outfit, PSR, says that Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh would beat Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas in a Palestinian presidential election.

This is the same Hamas that America, Europe and Israel have been variously boycotting, bombing and generally trying to exterminate for the past two years. The Annapolis peace process was meant to make Abbas popular; the economic stranglehold on Gaza was supposed to make Hamas hated. Failed, failed, failed.

Maybe this is why Olmert has said not once but twice this month that he wants to talk to Syria. Whenever the “Palestinian track” looks like it’s on the rocks, Israel revives the idea of peace talks with the one neighbouring country that it has had almost no actual friction with since 1973.

Could Olmert be serious this time? For a while this week I thought so. This month, Israel’s security services gave the cabinet their annual intelligence estimate. According to the reports, the Mossad and military intelligence agree that if America and Israel offer Syria a good enough deal, it would be ready to cut ties with the people Israel and America don’t like — Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran.

Why this is interesting is because the Mossad used to think otherwise. Perhaps it now believes that after Israel’s mysterious air strike on Syria in September, and after the assassination of Hizbullah’s man Imad Mughniyeh there last month — which Israel denies, but everyone assumes it did — the Syrians are now more scared and readier to talk. Last month Israel seemed to make use of that momentum by warning Damascus that if Hizbullah attacks Israel again, Israel will strike Syria.

In other words, with your eyes half-closed it could look like Israel is threatening Syria with consequences for bad behaviour while offering it a carrot for good behaviour — trying to lower Syria’s price.

And if you really read into the subtle nuances, Olmert seems to be lowering Israel’s price. Alon Liel, an Israeli diplomat who held back-channel talks with a Syrian expat from 2004 to 2006 (and who leaps on any sign of an Israeli-Syrian thaw), pointed out to me that Olmert has floated Syria talks about 10 or 15 times in the past 10 months. Often, he’s added the condition that Syria break its “Axis of Evil” ties first. But the last couple of times he’s said that negotiations could “lead to” Syria’s breaking those ties, a hint that he’s not so concerned about the preconditions any more.

The trouble is, a lot of senior Israelis are sceptical that Syria will simply turn its back on its old allies even if it gets back the Golan Heights and peace with Israel in return.

And outside Israel there’s even more scepticism. Recently various Western high-ups have been saying how disappointed they are with Syria. We heard it from a senior British official who came to Jerusalem last week; Angela Merkel said it today (German); Nicolas Sarkozy said it in December; George Bush says it every Monday and Thursday. Syria policy, Josh Landis says, is “the last red meat for the ‘freedom agenda’ crowd in the Republican Party” and is run by the last remaining neocons in the administration.

And Olmert, even if he wants to, can’t go against the American administration.

So don’t expect the talk of peace with Syria to come true. Take it, instead, as a sign of just how hopeless the Annapolis process has truly become.

One of the great things about working for a weekly is that I can usually avoid the press conferences, photo-ops, stake-outs and other feeding frenzies required of the purveyors of instant news. With Bush coming I’m especially glad. Here are some edited highlights from the schedule sent to the media (my emphasis added):

Tomorrow:

11:55 – Official reception at Ben-Gurion International Airport… entry via Terminal 1 by 09:00… MBU’s [ie, mobile broadcast units] to enter… by 07:00;

Thursday:

Meeting and Press Conference of the Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas with President of the United States of American (sic), George W. Bush… Press conference will begin at 11:30 a.m… All Press MUST arrive at the Press Gathering Point BEFORE 06.30.

Friday:

08:10-09:40 – Visit Yad Vashem…. Pool members at PM’s Jerusalem Office by 06:00

Not that the rest of us are going to have it easy. Jerusalem traffic has already slowed to about half its usual speed. Military choppers keep buzzing overhead in both Jerusalem and Ramallah. There are more guns around than at an NRA convention. People are avoiding making appointments for the next couple of days. Some who commute between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are finding places to stay overnight so they don’t have to make the trip. Some offices in Jerusalem have given their employees the time off; one friend who works for an international agency has been told to stay at home because of “security concerns”, though it’s not clear whether they’re afraid their employees will get caught up in a assassination attempt or run over by a speeding presidential limousine.

This had better be good.